Overuse in Products Liability by Gardels, David E.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 3 Article 9
1978
Overuse in Products Liability
David E. Gardels
University of Nebraska College of Law, david.gardels@huschblackwell.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
David E. Gardels, Overuse in Products Liability, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 817 (1978)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol57/iss3/9
Note
Overuse in Products Liability
I. INTRODUCTION
This note will examine products liability cases in which an
injury results in part from the "overuse" of a product. "Over-
use" can be defined as the use of a product beyond its safe
capacity. It is normally a use of the product in the intended
manner, not use in a manner for which the product was not
designed or manufactured. It is, therefore, a use of the product
for its normal purpose, but a use that is too fast, too strenuous,
or too much for the product's structural capacity. Examples
include subjecting an abrasive wheel to excessive speed,' put-
ting too much stress on a surgically implanted steel pin,2 and the
overinflation of a tire.3 These uses, because they are in the
normal and intended manner, should reasonably be foreseeable
to the manufacturer. That is, considering the environment of
the product's use (the work place, home, or roadway) it is nor-
mally foreseeable that a product may often be used beyond its
maximum capacity. The issue which must be addressed in over-
use cases is whether the manufacturer or the consumer should
bear responsibility for an injury caused in part by the product's
overuse.
This issue may be examined from two perspectives, that of
the consumer and that of the manufacturer. These perspectives
should be kept in mind when analyzing each case.4 The most
important aspect of the consumer perspective is the extent of
user awareness of the dangers of product use beyond the safe
capacity: is the consumer fully apprised of the inherent limita-
tion of the product and of the risks and dangers of use beyond
that limitation? The most important aspect with respect to
manufacturers is the ability of the manufacturer reasonably to
foresee the inherent danger of a product, including the likeli-
1. See notes 23 and 98 and accompanying text infra.
2. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
3. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
4. With regard to this dual perspective in strict tort liability, see Montgomery
& Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 844-45 (1976).
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hood of its being overused, and the cost and feasibility of reduc-
ing the risk of overuse.
The first section of this note will discuss overuse in the
context of warnings and design defectiveness. The second sec-
tion will examine overuse in cases dealing with questions of
causation. The final section will discuss overuse as related to
affirmative defenses based on the misconduct of the user. It is
not the purpose of this note to examine in depth the various
theories of products liability,5 and the discussion will, wherever
possible, apply generally to the products liability theories.
II. DEFECTIVENESS
A product may be "defective" because of an inadequacy of
manufacture, warnings, or design.6 Defects of manufacture are
for the most part excluded from this discussion. The safe capac-
ity of each product discussed herein is assumed to be the result
of a conscious design choice, as affected by the drafting of
accompanying warnings and instructions.
A. Warnings
A distinction between instructions and warnings must be
made in order to properly define the term "warnings. '7 A case
which illustrates this point is McCully v. Fuller Brush Co.,8
which dealt with a cleaning powder which was "overused." The
following language was contained on the cleaning powder box:
"To MAKE A GALLON OF CLEANING SOLUTION, simply dissolve
one to two tablespoonfuls of FULLER ALL PURPOSE CLEANER in a
gallon of hot water."9 However, the cleaner contained several
chemicals well known to be dangerous to human tissue.10 The
plaintiff placed an unspecified quantity of the powder in a buc-
ket, and diluted it with water. She then used the solution
continuously for four and one-half hours, frequently immersing
her bare hands into the solution. By the next morning her hands
were "red, burning and blistered";'1 the injury required periodic
medical treatment for almost three years.
The court, because of the defendant's failure to warn, revers-
5. The three theories of products liability are negligence, warranty, and strict
tort liability. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971).
6. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4) (f)(i) (1978).
7. Id. vol. 1 § 8.05(1).
8. 68 Wash. 2d 675, 415 P.2d 7 (1966).
9. Id. at 676, 415 P.2d at 8.
10. Id. at 676-77, 415 P.2d at 9.
11. Id. at 677, 415 P.2d at 9.
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ed a verdict for the defendant which had been based on the
defense of contributory negligence in failing to follow the given
instructions. Because the record was "devoid of evidence that
plaintiff was aware, or facts from which it can be said that she
should have been aware, of the product's potentially dangerous
attributes"12 the court held that the case should not have been
sent to the jury on such a theory. The court explained that there
is a distinction between instructions and warnings: instructions
are given to assure an effective use; warnings are given to
assure safe use.13 The court continued:
There were no expressions of warnings or caution on the label of
the container here sold to plaintiff. In fact, it bears repeating, the
words "It's Kind to Your Hands" were printed thereon. The mixing
instructions were directory only, not imparting notice to plaintiff that
deviation therefrom might have injurious consequences. 14
The importance of the instruction/warning distinction is that
a product which is unreasonably dangerous may be made safe
or non-defective with a proper warning. But mere instructions,
which do not explain the danger of their violation, will not be
adequate to make a product safe. 5 As illustrated by MeCully,
the overall impression conveyed by the label is important, and
"puffing" (the statement in McCully that the product was "kind
to hands") may well affect the adequacy of a mild warning.16 As
the case makes clear, an overuse of a product in violation of
mere instructions will not bar a plaintiff's recovery. This
conclusion is correct because mere instructions do not convey to
the consumer an awareness of the risks or dangers of a use
more strenuous than that instructed. When a user is not ap-
prised of the fact that a product does have a maximum safe
capacity for use in the intended manner, the defendant clearly
should not be relieved of liability for a use beyond that capacity.
Such a product is "defective," and the manufacturer should
bear responsibility for the injuries from use of the product.
Another aspect of defective warnings is the determination of
when the duty to warn arises. It has been stated that there is a
duty to warn of all product dangers that are reasonably foresee-
able.1 7 This duty is related primarily to the manufacturer's per-
spective of the overuse problem. When should the manufactur-
er, considering the total environment of a product's intended
12. Id. at 680, 415 P.2d at 10.
13. Id. at 678, 415 P.2d at 10.
14. Id. at 679, 415 P.2d at 10.
15. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 8.05(1).
16. Id. § 8.05(2).
17. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1973).
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use, foresee that there may be an overuse and, therefore, be
under a duty to inform the consumer of the dangers of such a
use?
In Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc. ,18 the plaintiff was the owner of an
apartment building which had burned to the ground when hair
rollers used by a tenant ignited and set fire to the building. The
defendant was the manufacturer of the hair rollers which were
designed to be heated in boiling water for fifteen minutes and
then placed in the hair. The hair rollers were filled with paraffin
which when melted would retain the heat and cause the rolled
hair to curl. The tenant had placed the rollers in a pan of water
as directed, but after turning the electric burner on "high," she
left the room and fell asleep. The water boiled away, the rollers
melted, and the paraffin ignited, starting the fire which destroy-
ed the plaintiff's building.19
The court in Gardner stated that a manufacturer would be
liable for injuries caused by a product if it (1) knew the product
was likely to be dangerous, (2) had reason to believe the
consumer would not realize the danger, and (3) failed to inform
the consumer of the dangerous condition of the product.20 In
reference to the dangerousness of the product, the court stated
that the manufacturer must anticipate uses for which the prod-
uct was designed and sold:
However, he must also be expected to anticipate the environment
which is normal for the use of his product and where, as here, that
environment is the home, he must anticipate reasonably foresee-
able risks of the use of his product in such an environment. These are
the risks which are inherent in the proper use for which his product is
manufactured. 21
This language clearly demonstrates that the uses the manu-
facturer is required to foresee are related to the total environ-
ment of the product's use. In Gardner, the curlers would not
have been dangerous if every user stood watch over the pan of
boiling water. However, as the decision correctly points out, in
the home environment, it is foreseeable that a user frequently
will be called away from the stove while the product is being
used in its intended manner. The overuse (allowing the pot to
boil dry and the rollers to melt) is therefore foreseeable, and the
manufacturer should be responsible for the results of the acci-
dent when no warning of the dangers has been given.22
18. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 240-41.
20. Id. at 242 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 395 (1965)).
21. Id. at 243 (citing Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir.
1962)).
22. The following cautionary note was present on the label: "Rollers may be
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When a duty to warn is established, the product will be non-
defective only if a warning is "adequate." Urich v. Kasco Abra-
sive Co.23 and Fegan v. Lynn Ladder Co.24 demonstrate this
proposition. In Ulrich, the basis of the plaintiff's complaint was
inadequate warnings. The plaintiff was employed in a manufac-
turing plant, frequently making use of a grinding machine to
which an abrasive wheel manufactured by the defendant was
attached. Affixed to the abrasive wheel was a label which
stated: "maximum r.p.m. 6000.''25 The court found that it was a
well-known fact in the industry that the danger of subjecting
abrasive wheels to excessive speed was that the wheel would
disintegrate. Shortly after the plaintiff began to use the mecha-
nism, the wheel disintegrated, causing parts of the wheel to
strike and seriously injure him. Post-accident testing revealed
that at the time of the accident the grinding machine ran at
speeds of up to 9000 r.p.m. 26
The analysis in Urich centered on the definition of the "de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user," lan-
guage used in the strict tort liability section of the Restatement
of Torts.27 The court stated that if a product is hazardous be-
cause of a danger which might not be comprehended by the
consumer, an adequate warning, affixed so that it should reach
the ultimate user, will be an important factor in determining
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. Affirming a
verdict for the defendant, the court held that the wheel itself
was not unreasonably dangerous, stating that
a jury could not justifiably find.., the wheel, marked and labeled as
it was, unreasonably dangerous in the sense that a prudent manufac-
turer of similar products fully apprised of the condition and tenden-
cies of the product when he put it in the stream of commerce would
have anticipated a substantial likelihood of injury .... 28
The statement "maximum r.p.m. 6000," coupled with ihe gener-
al knowledge in the industry, made the warning adequate and,
therefore, made the product safe for reasonably foreseeable
uses.
Warnings may be held inadequate if the information sup-
inflammable only if left over flame in pan without water. Otherwise Q.H.S.
Setting/Rollers are perfectly safe." Id. at 471. See note 76 and accompany-
ing text infra.
23. 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976).
24. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCi) 7387 at 13,682 (Mass.
App. 1975).
25. "R.p.m." is an abbreviation for "revolutions per minute."
26. 532 S.W.2d at 199.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
28. 532 S.W.2d at 200.
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plied is not sufficiently specific as to exactly what the safe
capacity of the product is. Fegan v. Lynn Ladder Co. ,29 involved
a ladder to which was affixed a label, that stated in part: "A
ladder is meant to carry only one person at a time. Do not
overload. ' 30 The ladder was a twenty-four-foot extension ladder
designed for commercial use, and was purchased for use by a
painting crew. The ladder was being used to support a simple
scaffold, which consisted of an eighteen-foot aluminum plank,
one end of which was supported by the extension ladder by
means of a "ladder jack," a device which hooked over rails of
the extension ladder near the top. The two plaintiffs had been
painting on the scaffold, about eighteen feet above the ground,
for only a few minutes when the rails of the extension ladder
broke, throwing the plaintiffs to the ground.3 '
The court stated that the defendant had reason to know, and
in fact did know, that ladders of this type would be used with
ladder jacks,32 and that there was no evidence that the danger of
use of the jacks was known to the plaintiffs or should have been
known to them. The court then held: "The warning given by the
defendant, that the ladder was not to be used by more than one
person at a time, had no obvious application to the foreseeable
use of the ladder with jacks or other scaffolding .... [T]he jury
could find that its warning was not sufficiently explicit. '33
In both Ulrich and Fegan the basic issue was whether the
consumer had been fully advised of the product's safe capacity
and the danger of exceeding it. Both courts concluded that if the
consumer has not been made aware of the limit or the danger,
the manufacturer should be held liable for the resulting in-
juries. In U/rich, the fact that the user was given a specific
statement of the safe capacity, and was aware of the danger of
exceeding that capacity, relieved the manufacturer of liability
for injuries caused by overuse. In the language of the strict tort
liability theory used in Ulrich, the product was not unreason-
29. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 7387 at 13,682 (Mass.
App. 1975).
30. Id. at 13,683.
31. Id.
32. An interesting aspect of this case, regarding defendant's ability to foresee
this particular use of the ladder, was the fact that the president of the
defendant manufacturer was also the secretary of the American Ladder
Institute, and had personally participated in writing that organization's
"ladder safety code." For ladders of the specific type involved in the acci-
dent, the code stated that the ladder "should not be used by more than one
man at a time nor with ladder jacks and scaffold planks where use by more
than one person is anticipated." Id.
33. Id.
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ably dangerous, and thus was non-defective. In Fegan, on the
other hand, the warnings were deemed inadequate due to a lack
of specificity. The plaintiff was not made aware of the safe
capacity of the ladder for the use to which it was being put, and
the manufacturer was, therefore, responsible for the injuries.
Because the consumer in Fegan was not effectively warned of
the limits of the ladder, the product was not reasonably safe.
Both cases were correctly decided on the warning issue. In
Ulrich it is difficult to conceive of how the manufacturer could
have provided a more specific warning. The only way for the
grinding wheel to be overused was by spinning it too fast, and of
this use the plaintiff was adequately warned. Further, the only
risk was of the wheel spinning apart, and the plaintiff surely
should have realized this danger. On the other hand, while a
warning was given in Fegan that the ladder should not be used
by two persons, it did not warn against the common use of the
ladder to support one end of a scaffold. The manufacturer
should have foreseen that some users might not translate the
danger of two persons into the danger of a scaffold.
The final aspect of warnings to be examined here is the issue
of to whom the warning must extend, that is, whether or not the
product itself must bear a warning label. In the past, if the
manufacturer supplied information with his product in the
form of accompanying literature, that was often found to be
sufficient.34 An example of such a case is McKay v. Upson-
Walton Co. ,35 in which the plaintiff's husband was killed when a
hook on a hoist apparatus straightened out, dropping a pipe
weighing 9100 pounds on the decedent. The hoist had a rated
-capacity. of only 5000 pounds, but only the catalogue number
appeared on the device. By use of this number, one could deter-
mine the rated capacity by referring to the defendant manufac-
turer's sales literature and to standard reference works avail-
able in the trade.
In affirming a judgment for the defendant, the court stated
that a verdict for the plaintiff would have been possible only if it
could have been concluded that the defendant was bound to
foresee that someone would attempt to use the hoist to lift a load
of 9100 pounds without ascertaining the device's load capacity.
The court held the defendant was not "chargeable with
34. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 6, § 8.03[3]. See also Bryant v.
Hercules, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Ky. 1970) (no duty personally to warn
individual miners against stacking dynamite near blasting point); Younger
v. Dow Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451 P.2d 177 (1969) (no duty to warn
vendee's employees of hazards of inhalation of chemical compounds when
vendee had been adequately warned).
35. 317 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1963).
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foresight of such careless and imprudent conduct on the part of
a user"36 and was not, therefore, under a duty to offer a warning
on the device. The court stated that the defendant had dis-
charged its duty to warn by making information available, and
was under no duty, in order to prevent such an "abusive use," to
take the extra step of labeling, which the court considered a
mere convenience to the user.
37
It is important to note that the date of McKay is 1963. In light
of more recent case law it is doubtful that the holding of that
case would be followed today. An example of a more recent case
on this issue is West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. 38 The
defendant in West was the manufacturer of a "sling," a length
of wire rope with eye hooks on each end. The sling was being
used in conjunction with other ropes and with pulleys to move a
large industrial machine, a use for which the sling was intended.
The evidence established that the force exerted on the sling at
the time of the accident was fifteen to twenty tons, and that the
safe capacity of the sling for this particular use was only 2.7
tons. When pressure was applied to the rope it parted with great
force, causing pieces of steel rope to lash out at great speed, one
piece striking the plaintiff, causing severe injury.39
The court first held that there clearly was a duty to warn of
the safe rated capacity of the sling. The more difficult question
for the court was whether the duty required placement of a
metal warning tag on the sling itself. The evidence showed that
the plaintiff and his co-workers were all journeymen ironwork-
ers, skilled in the use of such devices. The manufacturer's litera-
ture, which stated the safe working capacity of the sling when
used in various configurations, was supplied both to the em-
ployer and to the union local. Further, it was shown that the
union itself published rating material for such devices, and held
special training sessions for its members to ensure safe use of
the devices. Because of the specialized knowledge of the plain-
tiff and his co-workers, the court considered the question to be
very close. It held that the jury could properly find that the
manufacturer had breached its duty of reasonable care in fail-
ing to warn the ultimate user of the device of its safe working
capacity by means of a metal tag attached to the sling itself.4 0
36. Id. at 828.
37. Id.
38. 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972).
39. All the expert witnesses in the case agreed that it was almost a "religion"
with ironworkers not to stand near the ropes in the position plaintiff was
standing at the time of the accident. Id. at 207-08.
40. The court relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, Comment n
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The verdict for the plaintiff was, however, reversed on unre-
lated grounds and remanded for a new trial.41
As West illustrates, the scope of the duty to warn has ex-
panded in recent years.42 A well-stated version of the current
rule, which sums up the warnings area, is the following: "Where
warnings... are required to make a product non-defective, it is
the duty of the manufacturer to provide such warnings in a
form that will reach the ultimate consumer and inform of the
risks and inherent limits of the product. '43
A decision on the basis of warnings must be reached as an
initial step in overuse cases. When the consumer has not been
made aware of the inherent limitations on a product's safe use, it
is clear that a manufacturer should bear the cost of compensa-
tion for the injuries caused by use in the intended manner be-
yond that limitation. It is likewise clear that the manufacturer
can often foresee that the consumer, in the environment of the
home or work place, will use products beyond an inherent safe
capacity. A more difficult question arises when it has been
decided that the warnings are "adequate."
B. Design
It was previously stated that a product which would other-
wise be defective or unreasonably dangerous can sometimes be
rendered safe by the use of an adequate warning.44 As illus-
trated by the foregoing section, many overuse cases are decided
upon a warning analysis. The problem which will be addressed
in this section is a narrow issue within the broad category "de-
fective design." The issue is whether a manufacturer should be
required to design a product so that it cannot be overused, or so
that it will be safe even when being overused.45
(1965), which states in part:
Here, as in every case which involves the determination of the
precautions which must be taken to satisfy the requirements of
reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved must be
compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring
them... and the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by
the chance that some harm may result but also the serious or trivial
character of the harm which is likely to result.
41. 427 F. Supp. at 215.
42. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, §§ 8.01, 8.03[3].
43. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 103, 337 A.2d 893, 903
(1975).
44. See § II-A of text supra.
45. On the close relationship between warning and design defect analyses, see
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 495 (1976).
826 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 3 (1978)
It is suggested that this question may be answered by the
careful application of a risk-utility balancing test which ex-
amines the product and its warnings to determine whether the
product should be altered in design to make it safe for those
who use it beyond its safe capacity. The suggested analysis
takes the form of the risk-utility test, stated in a recent "crash-
worthiness" case, Bowman v. General Motors Corp.46 In its
discussion of the problems of examining a manufacturer's
conscious design choice, the court in Bowman observed that
there is no objective standard by which a jury can measure an
alleged defect. "This result stems, at least in part, from the fact
that a conscious design choice necessarily involves a trade-off
among safety, utility, and cost. '47 The court used the unreason-
able danger standard in framing its design analysis: "As we see
it, the unreasonably dangerous concept, properly formulated,
posits a risk-utility balancing test pursuant to which the jury
makes a judgment as to the social acceptability of the conscious
design choice trade-off."48
Bowman adopted a four factor balancing test,49 which may
be used to consider whether a product, as designed and with its
accompanying warnings, is unreasonably dangerous. The fol-
lowing factors are to be considered when applying this balanc-
ing test: (1) the likelihood that the product as marketed will
result in injury, (2) the seriousness of the potential injury, (3) the
ability of the manufacturer to eliminate the unsafe characterist-
ics of the product, and (4) the dangerousness of the product
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
user.
50
This test will be applied to two cases involving an overuse
fact pattern. The first is West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope
Co.,51 discussed above, in which a wire rope with a specific
46. 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
47. Id. at 241.
48. Id. at 242. The notion that the courts are a proper place to make such
technical design choices has not been universally accepted. The leading
article asserting that courts are not competent to decide conscious design
cases, which provoked much discussion of the point, is Henderson, Judi-
cial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). For an excellent rebuttal of
Henderson's article, and his reply thereto, see Twerski, supra note 45;
Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541
(1976).
49. For variations of the multi-factor risk-utility test, see, e.g., Fisher, Prod-
ucts Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974);
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 4, at 818; Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
50. Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 243-44 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
51. 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972). See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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rated capacity broke, seriously injuring the plaintiff, because it
was being used in excess of its safe capacity. For present pur-
poses, it will be assumed that the warning of safe capacity was
adequate, and was present on the rope itself as the court held it
should have been. It was admitted in West by all parties that the
consequences of a rope breaking in a moving operation were
very serious, and that safety required careful consideration of
the capacity of the ropes used to maneuver heavy machinery.
The danger of the product was apparently well known to the
ironworkers, and the likelihood of ropes breaking in such oper-
ations was also known to be fairly great. The most important of
the factors in this particular example is, however, the ability of
the manufacturer to eliminate the unsafe characteristics of the
product. It would of course have been possible for the defend-
ant to manufacture a wire rope of greater strength, and perhaps
one strong enough to withstand the use to which the rope in
West was being put. But making the rope that strong would
have probably made it too inflexible and heavy for most of the
uses for which this rope was intended and desired. Therefore,
with these assumptions, it is likely that a risk-utility analysis
would result in a finding that a wire rope, marketed with proper
warnings, would not be unreasonably dangerous.
An example of a case in which the use of the risk-utility test
would produce a different result than that actually reached is
Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc. 52 In Turner, the
plaintiff and his co-workers were using a one-half ton hoist in an
attempt to break up a large mass of scrap metal called a "freeze-
up." This freeze-up resulted from an incomplete melting proc-
ess in the recycling section of the employer's plant. Warnings
which accompanied the hoist, and which were in the possession
of the employer, warned that the hoist should not be overloaded,
that the weight of each object to be lifted should always be
ascertained before a lifting attempt was made, and that the load
should always be free of obstructions.5 3
From the standpoint of a risk-utility analysis, what is inter-
esting about the fact situation of Turner is the nature of the
accident and the insignificant cost of preventing it. The hook on
the upper surface of the hoist, by which it hung from a movable
boom, was "open-throated." The accident occurred when plain-
tiff attached a rope from the hoist to the mass of metal and
52. 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975). The case was decided on the theory that it
was an unforeseeable misuse of the product to use it in the manner in
which it was being used at the time of the accident, and the defendant
prevailed.
53. Id. at 252, 217 S.E.2d at 869.
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signaled a co-worker to activate the hoist, hoping to break off a
part of the mass. The hook by which the hoist rope was attached
to the load suddenly broke free, causing a "backlash" which
jarred the hoist off the boom.5 4 The falling hoist struck the
plaintiff, causing serious injuries. It was undisputed that the
accident could have been prevented by a safety device to close
the throat of the hook, which was in fact offered by the defend-
ant as "optional" equipment. The cost to the manufacturer of
this device was only fifty-five cents.55
In Turner, the likelihood of injury was probably small, since
even the plaintiff's experts could not cite another instance of a
hoist falling from its position due to an open throated hook. The
seriousness of the potential injury, however, was very great. It
could also fairly be stated that the dangerousness of the product
should have been well known to the user, both because of the
warnings and the danger that should have been contemplated
by an ordinary user in plaintiff's position. The decisive factor,
however, should be the trivial cost of the safety device
compared with the cost 5f the hoist. The risk-utility balancing
concept, which was not used in Turner, should have resulted in
a verdict for the plaintiff. The insignificant cost of the safety
device, and the fact that it would not reduce in any way the
utility of the product, should, when considered with the serious-
ness of the potential injury, make the product unreasonably
dangerous.
The application of a risk-utility balancing test to a product
with "adequate" warnings is a step which need not necessarily
be made separately from a warning analysis. It is suggested,
however, that such a test could be used after a warning analysis
to be sure that the product is indeed safe for the ordinary
consumer. There are certainly many circumstances in which an
overuse or abusive use of a product should bar recovery by an
injured user. Such a use should not, however, bar recovery in a
case like Turner, in which the cost of preventing the danger was
so small.
The focus of the warning analysis is on whether the
consumer has been made aware of the limitations and dangers
of the product. The focus of the design analysis, with a risk-
utility examination, is on the manufacturer. This balancing
process seeks to determine if the manufacturer should go be-
yond warning of a foreseeable overuse and be required to rede-
sign the product or remove it from the market. The application
54. Id. at 248, 217 S.E.2d at 866.
55. Id. at 253, 217 S.E.2d at 869.
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of a risk-utility test to the entire product at some point in a
court's analysis should result in a more just distribution of
losses in cases involving the use of a product beyond its safe
capacity.
III. CAUSATION
Causation is, of course, an essential element of a plaintiff's
case in every products liability action. After plaintiff establishes
that a product is defective, causation must be shown, that is, the
defect must have been the cause in fact and proximate cause of
the accident.56 What creates some confusion with regard to the
causation concept is that the same circumstantial evidence used
by the plaintiff to prove defectiveness may be relied on to estab-
lish causation.57 As one court has put the issue, "use different
from or more strenuous than that contemplated to be safe by
ordinary users/consumers, that is, 'misuse' would ... refute a
defective condition or causation. '58 Discussed in this section are
overuse cases in which causation issues figure prominantly.
A. Cause in Fact
In Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hospital, Inc.,59 the plaintiff had
suffered a severe fracture of the tibia of his left leg, necessitat-
ing the insertion of a "Rush pin"60 to stabilize the fracture. The
plaintiff's leg was in a cast for more than one year. When the
doctor removed the cast, he strictly instructed the plaintiff that
he was not to walk or place his weight upon the leg as it was not
yet completely healed. When plaintiff returned to the doctor one
week later, complaining of pain, it was discovered that the metal
pin was broken. The plaintiff admitted that he had walked on
the leg without crutches several times.61
The plaintiff sued the pin manufacturer, contending that the
pin was defective. In support of his case, plaintiff introduced
extensive scientific analysis of the pin which indicated the pres-
56. The cause in fact-proximate cause distinction is discussed in Owen, The
Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liability
and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 777-87
(1977), and 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, §§ 11.01-.02.
57. 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 135, at 143 (1972); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
1057, 1084-85 (1967).
58. Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965). See
also 3B A. AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES § 21, at 46-47 (rev. ed.
1971).
59. 24 Ill. App. 3d 599, 321 N.E.2d 428 (1974).
60. This device is essentially a stainless steel rod.
61. 24 Ill. App. 3d at 600-03, 321 N.E.2d at 429-31.
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ence in the pin of numerous "inclusions"6 2 and the existence of
scratches on its surface. An expert testified for the plaintiff that
without the inclusions and scratches the pin would have been
fifty percent stronger.63 Experts testified for the defendant that
the purpose of a Rush pin was merely to stabilize a fracture, that
it was not meant to bear a person's weight until a fracture was
completely healed, and that walking on an unhealed leg would
be enough to cause breakage of a pin.6
4
Both the trial and appeal in Stewart centered on causation.
The trial court concluded that none of the evidence pointed to
the fact that the "defects" were the cause of the break. Instead,
the evidence was found to show that even if the Rush pin had
been of the purest quality, with no defects at all, plaintiff's act of
walking on the unhealed leg would have caused the break. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment for the defendant. 65
Lavella v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,66 was also decided
on the basis of cause in fact. The court rejected evidence pro-
duced by the plaintiff that the tire involved contained a manu-
facturing defect,67 and held that the cause of the tire's explosion
was the manner in which the plaintiff attempted to mount the
tire on the wheel or "rim." Shortly before the accident, some of
the plaintiff's co-workers had mounted the tire, but as the car
was driven away from the garage, it was discovered that the tire
was not properly "seated" on the rim. The improper mounting
apparently caused a weakness in the "bead" of the tire. The
plaintiff had some difficulty remounting the tire, and tried to
force the tire into place by rapidly over-inflating it. At that
point, the tire exploded injuring the plaintiff. The court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove the explosion was
caused by defective manufacture of the tire, and dismissed the
complaint.68
Lavella and Stewart both involved an overuse of a product.
In each case the plaintiff attempted to prove that the product
contained a manufacturing defect which was the cause of the
accident. In each the defendant proved that an overuse, and not
a defect of manufacture, was the cause in fact of the accident.
Both conclusions appear to be correct as to the existence of a
62. "Inclusions" are particles of foreign matter within a metal object which
make it weaker than metal of greater purity.
63. 24 Ill. App. 3d at 601, 321 N.E.2d at 430.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 604, 321 N.E.2d at 432.
66. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 7130, No. 72C414
(E.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25, 1974).
67. Id. at 12, 682 n.4.
68. Id. at 12,681.
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manufacturing defect; however, the question of whether the
manufacturer should improve the product's safety should also
be asked in such cases.69
A defective design analysis was considered by the court in
Stewart without explicit recognition. The court discussed the
function of the rod which was, according to testimony, not to
bear a person's weight, but merely to stabilize a fracture while
the bone healed. One of the witnesses testified that it would not
be desirable to have a rod serve as a weight bearing device.70
This would go to the risk-utility factor of the manufacturer's
ability to make the product safer. The usefulness and desirabili-
ty of the rod was that it would assist the bones in correctly
growing into place. A pin or steel device large enough to support
a person's weight while the fracture was unhealed apparently
would not have been beneficial in healing the fracture.
The Lavel1a court did not consider the issue of improving the
product's safety. However, if making a tire so rigid that it
cannot be blown apart by excess air pressure when improperly
mounted would make it impractical for use as a tire, it may be
assumed that a risk-utility balance would also result in a verdict
for the defendant in such a case.
A cause in fact analysis may properly be utilized to establish
whether the overuse of the product or a manufacturing defect
caused the accident. What should be recognized in the overuse
context is that it does not decide whether the manufacturer has
a duty to design a better and safer product. While that decision
may be implicit in some decisions, as it was in Stewart, it should
not be ignored by the parties or the court in the consideration of
a case involving product overuse and a question of cause in fact.
B. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause, an often troublesome concept in tort law,
involves the idea that liability must be limited in every case by
the requirement that there be "some reasonable connection be-
tween the act or omission of the defendant and the damage
which the plaintiff has suffered."' 71 The "reasonable connec-
tion" is often established by a demonstration that the type of
injury suffered by the plaintiff was "reasonably foreseeable" by
the manufacturer.7 2
69. See § II-B of text supra.
70. 24 IRl. App. 3d 599, 601, 321 N.E.2d 428, 430 (1974).
71. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 41, at 236.
72. See, e.g., Wilcheck v. Doonan Truck & Equip. Inc., 220 Kan. 230, 552 P.2d
938 (1976).
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One way in which the proximate cause-foreseeability analy-
sis has been used in cases involving overuse, has been to bar the
recovery by stating that the manufacturer will not be held to
have foreseen that the product will be used in violation of ade-
quate warnings. 73 In Holbrook v. Koehring Co.,74 a crane
collapsed when being used to lift a load 19,000 pounds beyond
its maximum capacity. The court affirmed the rejection of an
instruction requested by the plaintiff that would have allowed
the jury to find that overuse of this type was foreseeable. It
would have been an error to so instruct the jury, the court held,
when the plaintiff was using the crane beyond its known max-
imum capacity.7
5
The type of analysis used in Holbrook strains the term
"foreseeability" because the manufacturer should be able to
foresee that a product will likely be used beyond its safe capac-
ity, or it would not have given the warning. The foreseeability
analysis in the overuse context, therefore, is frequently shifted
back to a warning analysis: what should the defendant have
forseen and thus warned against. For example, in Gardner v.
Q.H.S., Inc.,6 the case which involved paraffin-filled hair
rollers setting an apartment building on fire, the court first
concluded that the boiling of the rollers until the water
completely evaporated was foreseeable, and the manufacturer,
therefore, had a duty to warn of the danger of such an occur-
rence. The warnings given were held inadequate for that pur-
pose. The court then considered the defendant's argument that
the actions of the user of the rollers, who fell asleep and allowed
the pot to boil dry, were the sole proximate cause of the fire.
Referring to the warning discussion, the court said it was clear
that a jury could well have concluded that this exact chain of
consequences should have been foreseen, and that the user's
acts did not, therefore, relieve the manufacturer of liability.
In summary, it should normally be reasonable to foresee that
a product, which has an inherent maximum safe capacity when
being used in its normal and intended manner, will likely be
used beyond that capacity by an ordinary consumer. A warning
should, therefore, be required. In other words, the manufactur-
er should be responsible for (that is, the product's condition
should be the proximate cause of) every use beyond the max-
imum safe capacity unless an adequate warning has been given.
73. This concept was expressed in the misuse-defense context in Sun Valley
Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602 n.4 (D. Idaho
1976).
74. 75 Mich. App. 592, 255 N.W.2d 698 (1977).
75. Id. at 595, 255 N.W.2d at 699-700.
76. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971). See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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This may account for the number of cases in which the warning
issue is central in the overuse context.
IV. DEFENSES
Overuse may also be analyzed as an affirmative defense. The
rationale of the products liability defenses most used in the
overuse context-misuse and assumption of risk-is that there
are some uses of a product by a plaintiff for which the manufac-
turer should not be held responsible.
If a consumer employs a product in some extraordinary manner, and
encounters a known danger in the course of his conduct, the doctrine
of product misuse will bar recovery from the manufacturer. The ad-
venturous consumer has voluntarily placed himself in a category dis-
tinct from the normal consumer who forgoes the pleasure and
convenience of using products in novel but dangerous ways. The
rationale of loss distribution does not reach his case because it is
unfair to force consumers who forgo these additional benefits to sub-
sidize those individuals who voluntarily take the additional risks.
77
Such a rationale would appear to apply as well to all defenses
based on user's misconduct.7 8
A. Assumption of Risk
The most simple definition of assumption of risk in the strict
tort context is conduct by which the plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeds to encounter a known danger.79 This
defense recognizes the idea that a manufacturer cannot protect
against every use of his product and the consumer, therefore,
must be allowed to "weigh safety values against other benefits,
at least under circumstances when they can perceive the risks
and benefits with relative clarity." 80 In other words, when a
consumer makes a choice to use a product beyond its known
safe capacity, the manufacturer should not be responsible for
the choice. This concept seemingly applies to cases involving
plaintiff overuse.
A case which relied on the assumption of risk defense is
77. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufac-
ture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 89 (1973) (footnote omitted).
78. Contributory negligence will not be discussed in this note. The concept, in
the sense of failure to discover a defect or to guard against it, is not
particularly useful in the overuse context where the safe capacity of a
product is made clear to the consumer. This definition of contributory
negligence is taken from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment n (1965). Furthermore, it is not a defense to strict tort liability;
assumption of risk and misuse are defenses to all three products liability
theories. 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability §§ 32,33, 100, 101, 149, 150 (1972).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
80. Holford, supra note 77, at 89.
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Stark v. Allis-Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc. 81 In Stark the
husband of the plaintiff was killed while operating a front-end
loader when the rear of the tractor pitched up, throwing him
over the hood of the loader. He was crushed between the hood
and the "bucket." The court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could have found an assumption of
risk by the deceased, and affirmed a verdict for the defendant.
82
-The record revealed that the deceased was an experienced
operator of front-end loaders. The machine in question was
new, but was not stable when it was operated at excessive speed
with the bucket carried too high and overloaded. The deceased
was operating the machine in this manner at the time of the
accident. The decedent apparently had knowledge of the danger
of being thrown off the machine, since he had termed the new
machine a "bucking bronko." He was also found to know that
the machine was stable if not operated in a reckless manner. As
to voluntariness, it was found that he had not been ordered to
proceed in that fashion (as is often the case in on-the-job prod-
ucts liability actions) but had been specifically counseled by a
fellow employee to operate the machine more safely.8 3 The rea-
sonableness of the decedent's action was not in issue as it had
not been properly raised at trial. However, it would seem that
the court would have allowed a jury finding of unreasonable-
ness to stand under these facts.
Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Langley8 4 is a case
in which assumption of risk could have been well applied to the
facts. Instead, the court decided for the defendant manufactur-
er on several other grounds, including misuse and a finding that
the product was not defective.
The plaintiff in Langley purchased a home permanent,
manufactured by the defendant, which had extensive instruc-
tions and warnings on the package. The label directed the plain-
tiff to make a test curl before using the hair waving solution,
and to stop the procedure at once if the hair in the test patch
became gummy, discolored, frizzy, or brittle. What made the
case particularly appropriate for assumption of risk is that the
plaintiff admitted during the trial that she had read the label
and had understood clearly the instructions and warnings.
Plaintiff, after reading the label, made the test curl by applying
the solution for only one-half of the time directed for the test,
and then applied the liquid to the rest of her hair, allowing it to
81. 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854 (1970).
82. Id. at 401, 467 P.2d at 856.
83. Id. at 401, 467 P.2d at 856.
84. 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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remain on her hair for twice the instructed period.85 As a result
the plaintiff's hair was badly damaged. The elements of as-
sumption of risk-voluntariness, appreciation of the danger,
and unreasonableness of the decision so to use the product-
would all appear to be present, and assumption of risk could
have been correctly applied to these facts.
Assumption of risk has not been as widely used in the over-
use fact situation as might be expected. One reason for this
perhaps is that the elements of voluntariness, unreasonable-
ness, and knowledge of the danger are difficult to prove in many
cases. While in Stark the deceased was quoted as describing his
awareness of the danger, and in Langley the plaintiff admitted
reading and understanding the warnings, such clear facts of
voluntariness and knowledge of the danger will seldom exist.86
What the Stark court and others have neglected to consider
is whether the manufacturer should have a duty to prevent the
consumer from assuming the risk in the first instance. One
commentator has suggested 87 that an additional inquiry should
be made in the assumption of risk analysis. This commentator
would impose, prior to the use of an assumption of risk analysis,
the use of a duty analysis which would ask: "[I]s it the desire of
the law to impose a duty upon defendants to preclude plaintiffs
from choice-making?"88 The suggested analysis would examine
the product and the environment of its usage, "taking into ac-
count the kind of policy considerations which are best ex-
pressed within the framework of tort duty law."89 This scheme
would first determine, based on policy considerations of risk
and social utility, whether the manufacturer has a duty to pre-
vent plaintiffs from choosing to use the product in a dangerous
manner. If such a duty is found, the case would then be resolved
in favor of the plaintiff. It is only after it is determined that the
consumer should be allowed to make a choice to encounter the
danger that the assumption of risk examination should come
into play.
It may be true that the courts frequently achieve the correct
decision based on a traditional assumption of risk analysis, but
the addition of this explicit duty consideration should ensure a
85. Id. at 775.
86. Two leading articles on assumption of risk in strict tort liability are Twers-
ki, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructing Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Area, 60 IowA L. REV. 1 (1974), and R. Keeton, Assump-
tion of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961).
87. Twerski, supra note 86.
88. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 51.
836 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 3 (1978)
better result. In Langley9" an application of such a duty analysis
would likely produce the same result. It is probable that the
small risk of temporary harm to the hair, when coupled with the
desirable result of the product when used correctly, would re-
sult in a finding that there is no duty to preclude the plaintiff
from choice making. This would seem to be the kind of product
where consumers, properly warned, should be given the choice
of proceding with the use of the product.
On the other hand, Stark v. Allis-Chalmers & Northwest
Roads, Inc.,91 is the type of case in which a duty analysis could
have produced a different result. Given the magnitude of the
danger, along with the likelihood that at sometime a driver
would, under the pressure of the work place, operate the ma-
chine with haste and without great care, Stark may be a situa-
tion in which the manufacturer should be precluded from giv-
ing users a choice. The machine could perhaps have been made
safer by the addition of a safety bar,92 or the use of a smaller
bucket, or one which could not be carried as high-any of which
could have improved the safety and stability of the machine. If
any of these changes were feasible, and would not significantly
impair the product's usefulness, the manufacturer should have
been under a duty to preclude the plaintiff from encountering
the danger and "overusing" the machine in this manner.
The assumption of risk analysis fits the overuse fact pattern
well. In this context, where the product carries an adequate
warning and does not contain a manufacturing defect, the as-
sumption of risk analysis outlined above considers the two key
factors which should be examined in every overuse case-
manufacturer foresight and consumer awareness. The initial
duty analysis examines the problem of the manufacturer's abili-
ty to foresee the dangers of his product as well as the feasibility
of making the product safer. Then the analysis of whether the
plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably encountered the
known danger examines the consumer's awareness of the prod-
uct's safe capacity. If a plaintiff knows and appreciates the
danger of using the product, and voluntarily and unreasonably
90. 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See note 84 and accompanying text
supra.
91. 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854 (1970). See note 81 and accompanying text
supra.
92. The plaintiff brought up a negligent design theory on appeal, specifically
alleging the accident could have been prevented by the addition of an
inexpensive safety bar. She was precluded from pursuing this theory on
appeal, however, because she had failed to assert the theory during dis-
covery or at trial. Id. at 403, 467 P.2d at 857.
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proceeds nevertheless, the case should be decided in favor of
the defendant manufacturer.
B. Misuse
Misuse as a defense concept has also been applied in the
overuse fact situation. Misuse has been termed "abnormal han-
dling"93 and has been defined as a use of a product that is not
foreseeable.94
Since an overuse is a use in the intended or normal manner
beyond the product's safe capacity, neither of these definitions
fits the overuse situation well. Furthermore, such a use should
normally be foreseeable by a manufacturer of a product with a
maximum safe capacity.95 The confusing terminoligy of "abnor-
mal" and "unforeseeable" use has nonetheless been used to
limit a manufacturer's liability when a product has been used
beyond its safe limits, provided that the limits and dangers are
made apparent to the user. In other words, the manufacturer
will not be held responsible for the use of a product in violation
of adequate warnings of safe capacity, not because he could not
foresee that such a violation would never occur, but because a
reasonable consumer, adequately warned, will not make such a
use of the product. This of course embodies the policy that the
loss distribution rationale should not apply to such cases.9 6 In
other words, a manufacturer will not be held responsible for
injuries caused by a use of a product "so unusual that the aver-
age consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be
designed and manufactured to withstand it."197
McCurter v. Norton Co.,98 involved the use of an abrasive
wheel manufactured by the defendant. The wheel was attached
to a grinding machine which was not manufactured by the de-
fendant. The plaintiff was an experienced grinder, frequently
using the machine in the course of his employment in a manu-
facturing complex. Stamped on the wheel were the words
"MAX 2545 RPM." The court stated that the plaintiff had used
the grinding machine almost daily, and that he knew the grinder
was capable of turning at a speed of up to 18,000 r.p.m. The
plaintiff also knew that the words stamped on the wheel indi-
cated the maximum safe-operating speed for that particular
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965).
94. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598,602 (D.
Idaho 1976).
95. See § III-B of text supra.
96. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
97. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 306, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1973).
98. 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968).
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wheel. The plaintiff did not use any device to measure the speed
of the grinder, but adjusted the speed to what he estimated to be
2500 r.p.m. The wheel disintegrated before plaintiff touched it to
the work, causing the injury. The plaintiff apparently had no
evidence to present on the existence of the defect except for
fragments of the wheel and the occurrence of the accident. The
court noted that "the testimony presented by the [defendant]
that there was an unreasonable use on the part of the [plaintiff]
contrasts with the absence of evidence ... that the wheel was in
defective condition."99 The court went on to recognize that such
misuse was a defense to strict tort liability and was properly
used here to refute the allegation of defective condition.
In Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Langley, °0 0 dis-
cussed above with reference to assumption of risk, one ground
of the verdict for the defendant was the defense of misuse. The
court was "of the opinion that Mrs. Langley's violation of the
plain warnings and instructions was a misuse of the Milk Wave
Lilt and constitute[d] a defense to her cause of action. 10 1 The
court thought that this was an especially strong case of misuse
because the warnings of proper use were plain and explicit and
had been read by the plaintiff.
Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.,10 2 discussed in
the design section above, was also decided on the basis of mis-
use. The product was safe when used in a normal manner, and
for loads which were within the one-half ton capacity of the
hoist. The use to which the product was being put was, the court
held, a clear misuse of the product.
Misuse is not, of course, successful in every case in which it is
presented as a defense. In Singer v. Walker'03 the plaintiff was
using a fourteen ounce geologist's hammer, "guaranteed un-
breakable in all normal use. ' 10 4 Plaintiff found an approximate-
ly three-pound quartz rock on an afternoon outing, and in an
attempt to break the rock open, struck it as hard as possible
with the hammer. A piece of steel broke off from the hammer,
99. Id. at 406-07, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96 (emphasis in original).
100. 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See notes 84 and 90 and accompany-
ing text supra.
101. Id. at 778. The court relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment j (1965), which states in part: "Where a warning is given, the
seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a prod-
uct bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
102. 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975). See notes 52-55 and accompanying text
supra.
103. 39 App. Div. 2d 90, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1972).
104. Id. at 92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
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striking the plaintiff in the eye, necessitating its removal. The
defendant manufacturer alleged that the hammer was being
misused, that is, used in an abnormal manner for which the
product was not manufactured or guaranteed. Experts for de-
fendant testified that such a small hammer would foreseeably
be used only to chip the edges off a rock of this size, and was not
meant to break open such rocks. Instead, defendant main-
tained, a chisel or small sledge hammer would be used to break
rocks open. The court was unconvinced by this assertion, which
it stated "presents a rather subtle distinction between chipping
and breaking. ' '10 5 The court held that it was a question of fact
whether such a use was an unforeseeable misuse of the ham-
mer, and affirmed a verdict for'the plaintiff.10 6
In order to better apply the misuse defense to overuse cases it
is suggested that the analysis considered above in connection
with assumption of risk be used with the misuse defense as
well.10 7 Under such an analysis, an overuse should not bar a
plaintiff's recovery unless the manufacturer has met his duty to
design the product so that the consumer is not faced with the
choice of encountering unreasonable dangers. The clearest ex-
ample of how such an analysis should work is the Turner deci-
sion.108 The same kind of risk-utility balancing should be used to
reach a policy decision on whether or not the product, as manu-
factured and marketed, should be available for consumer use.
As discussed in the design section, 0 9 the fifty-five cent cost of a
safety device that would have prevented the accident should
have outweighed the admittedly small likelihood of the hoist
being "unhooked," even by such an abusive use. In spite of the
fact that the use in that case was clearly in violation of the
adequate warnings of the product's safe capacity, sound public
policy should require that the minor adjustment be made to the
product. Again, such an analysis may be inherent in the hold-
ings of most courts on an asserted misuse defense, but separate
recognition of the duty concept should provide a more desirable
social result.
Once this question of the manufacturer's ability to foresee
and prevent unreasonable risks has been considered, the misuse
concept should be applied. The misuse question applied to over-
use cases should not ask whether the manufacturer could
105. Id. at 93, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
106. Id. at 94, 99, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 827, 832.
107. See Twerski, supra note 86; text accompanying note 86 supra.
108. Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863(1975). See notes 52 and 102 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
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foresee the overuse (which should normally be foreseeable) but
whether this use was a "use . . .so unusual that the average
consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be design-
ed and manufactured to withstand it." 110 This focuses upon the
consumer awareness of the product's safe capacity and the dan-
gers of exceeding it. For example, in McCurter v. Norton Co.,"'
the average consumer of an industrial grinding wheel, once
apprised of the maximum capacity and the danger, could not
reasonably be expected to use the product beyond the safe ca-
pacity. On the other hand, in Singer v. Walker,"2 it was correct-
ly held that there was no misuse, because the average consumer
could not be expected to consider the use of a geologist's ham-
mer to break a rock to be a use that the product would not
withstand. If the suggested analysis is followed, the misuse de-
fense will examine both the manufacturer's ability to foresee
the danger and to improve his product, and the consumer's
awareness of the safe capacity of the product. This complete
misuse defense would be a valid method of examining overuse
cases and, if correctly applied, should properly allocate the
losses from product-caused injuries." 3
110. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 306, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1973).
111. 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968). See note 98 and accompany-
ing text supra.
112. 39 App. Div. 2d 90, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1972). See note 103 and accompanying
text supra.
113. In the cases discussed in the defense section, the successful assertion of the
defense by the defendant completely barred the plaintiff's recovery. This
need not be the case in all situations, however, and the state of the law on
this point is now undergoing a transformation.
If the action is based on negligence, the usual negligence rules of the
jurisdiction will apply as to whether the conduct of the plaintiff which is a
proximate cause of the accident in conjunction with the negligence of the
defendant will bar plaintiff's recovery, or will merely serve to reduce the
plaintiff's recovery by the application of comparative negligence.
In strict tort liability, there is a split among the states as to whether or
not a misuse, assumption of risk or other act of the plaintiff, which is a
proximate cause (but not the sole proximate cause) of the accident, will bar
plaintiff's recovery. The rule in some states is that plaintiff's recovery will
be barred completely. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 22 n.11 (1972).
The rule in other jurisdictions is, however, that plaintiff's acts or negli-
gence which are a contributing proximate cause will not bar plaintiff's
strict liability recovery unless the plaintiff's acts are the sole proximate
cause of the injury. See, e.g., Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co., 101 Ill. App.
2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1968), aff'd, 45 Ill. 2d 506,260 N.E.2d 230 (1970); Post v.
Manitowoc Engineering Corp., 88 N.J. Super. 199, 211 A.2d 386 (1965); 63
AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 22 n.12 (1972).
Another possibility is the application of a rule that will reduce, but not
bar, plaintiff's recovery by the application of the rules of comparative
negligence to strict liability actions. Texas recently adopted this rule in
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See also
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
V. CONCLUSION
Overuse, as defined in this note, is a use beyond a product's
safe capacity. The foregoing discussion has presented several of
the principal ways in which courts have examined the overuse
fact pattern. There are, of course, many cases in which such a
use properly should bar or reduce a plaintiff's recovery. How-
ever, it is suggested that additional attention should be devoted
in each case to the question of whether the manufacturer should
have the duty to prevent such an overuse.
In warning cases114 the courts determine, on the basis of what
kinds of uses are foreseeable, the things that a manufacturer is
required to warn against. Unfortunately, as the defective design
section suggested," 5 some courts have stopped with the proposi-
tion that if the warnings are adequate, no further duty exists on
the part of the manufacturer. It is submitted that the entire
product-the physical product together with its accompanying
warnings and instructions-should be subjected to a risk-utility
balancing process to determine if the goal of optimal product
safety requires that the manufacturer make design changes in
the product.
Overuse of a product should, of course, be a bar to recovery
when the product has been found to be safe and nondefective,
or when the overuse of the product rather than some "defect" is
found to have been the cause in fact of the injury.n 6 The cause
in fact issue cannot, however, be considered independently of
the other issues discussed herein, and care must be taken in
every case to assure that, in addition to a finding that there is no
defect of manufacture, warning, or design, there is not a duty to
further improve the product to prevent such an overuse.
Courts have generally not used the proximate cause concept
to limit manufacturers' liability in the cases discussed herein,
probably in part because the foreseeability question was usual-
ly taken up under the heading of the adequacy of the warning or
design. Moreover, an "overuse" of a product by consumers is
normally quite foreseeable." 7 The manufacturer thus would be
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska
1976); Feinberg, The Applicability of Comparative Negligence in a Strict
Products Liability Suit, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1975); Twerski, The Use and
Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV.
797 (1977); Note, The Defense of Misuse and Comparative Causation in
Products Liability, 14 HOUSTON L. REV. 1115 (1977).
114. See § II-A of text supra.
115. See § II-B of text supra.
116. See § Ill-A of text supra.
117. See § III-B of text supra.
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proximately responsible for such overuse-caused injuries, un-
less liability is cut off because of the adequacy of warning and
design, cause in fact, or one of the defenses.
The defenses of assumption of risk and misuse have been
frequently used in overuse cases to limit a manufacturer's re-
sponsibility for product caused injuries.1 8 At some point in a
sound consideration of an asserted defense, it is submitted that
a court should consider the question of whether the duty exists
to remove the product from the market or prevent the risk of
danger from overuse.
Under any of these three doctrinal approaches to cases in-
volving product overuse, two interrelated aspects of the prob-
lem should be kept in mind. The first is the scope of the manu-
facturer's duty reasonably to foresee the uses to which a prod-
uct will be put and its duty to design a safe product. One factor
which should be an element of the manufacturer's duty is a
requirement to foresee the total environment of a product's use,
which should normally include overuse. The other side of the
coin and the second important perspective of product overuse is
the extent of consumer awareness of the product's safe capac-
ity, which again must be related to the total environment of the
product's use.
If each case is examined from both of these perspectives, the
rules of warning, causation, and defense will not be applied in a
mechanical fashion, and sound results should be promoted.
There are many cases, particularly where the consumer has not
been adequately warned of the product's capacity, in which the
manufacturer should be liable for the overuse-caused injuries.
There are also cases in which a sound risk-utility analysis will
require that the manufacturer be held liable even when ade-
quate warnings are present, because it has not fulfilled its duty
to make the product safe for reasonably foreseeable uses-in-
cluding overuse. If the consumer is aware of the risks and dan-
gers, however, and proceeds to overuse the product, he or she
should be responsible for the injuries which result from over-
use. The considerations suggested in this note will not make the
manufacturer liable for every overuse; they should, however,
assure that proper attention is given to both the manufacturer's
duty and the scope of consumer awareness of a product's capac-
ity. Such considerations should encourage sound judicial deci-
sion making in products liability cases which involve overuse.
David E. Gardels '79
118. See § IV of text supra.
